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Article 10

Convergence?
Shubha Ghosh*
The Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.1 is
the most important pronouncement about the relationship
between patent and competition policy since the Statute of
Monopolies.2 Although it is hyperbole, the preceding statement
also contains more than a kernel of truth. Through the Statute
of Monopolies, the English Parliament established patents on
inventions as an exception to the general prohibition against
grants of monopoly privileges.3 The majority opinion in Actavis,
authored by Justice Breyer, rejected a sharp separation
between patent and antitrust laws—the position voiced in
dissent by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas.4 The dissent rests on the assumption that antitrust
and patent are distinct and largely non-overlapping bodies of
law,5 an assumption that can be traced back to the Statute of
Monopolies. Consequently, the majority opinion represents a
reworking of the relationship between intellectual property law
and antitrust. It may even signal a convergence of these two
battling areas of law into a broader discourse of competition
law and policy. But to end this paragraph on a low note,
contrasting with the upbeat opening, it is unlikely that the
Actavis opinion will have much influence beyond the narrow,
but critical, confines of the Hatch-Waxman Act.6 That is
unfortunate for competition law and policy.
© 2014 Shubha Ghosh
* University of Wisconsin, Madison, Law School.
1. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
2. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac., c. 3 (Eng.).
3. Id. §§ 5–6.
4. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“A patent carves
out an exception to the applicability of antitrust laws . . . . The [majority],
however, departs from this approach . . . .”).
5. See id.
6. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (HatchWaxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
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Since participants in this symposium are well-versed in the
facts of Actavis, I will not repeat them here. Instead, let me lay
out a summary of the majority and dissenting opinions and a
roadmap for my comments. The dissenting opinion is my
starting point because it represents what I consider the
traditional view of antitrust and patent law, as two competing
rival statutory schemes. What I demonstrate is that the dissent
represents a view going back to the Statute of Monopolies.
What it ignores is the common law and statutory developments
of patent and antitrust laws in the United States and the long
standing conflict between exclusionary rights and legislative
power, dating back to the Supreme Court chestnuts of Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819),7 Gibbons v. Ogden
(1824),8 and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837).9 For
reasons of analytical convenience and forgetfulness about
history, the patent-antitrust debate was reduced to convenient
antipodes. Neither the twain shall meet, one hoped, but the two
did meet through the poor draftsmanship of the HatchWaxman Act. Now Justice Breyer’s majority opinion
pragmatically sets the course straight by reminding us that
patent law and antitrust law need to be considered together.
The following comments flesh out these basic points. After
presenting the idea of convergence as represented in the
dissent and majority opinions in Actavis, I present the case for
convergence of antitrust and patent law. My pessimistic
conclusion is that, despite the need for convergence, intellectual
property and antitrust will remain, under the terms of the
Actavis decision, as dueling (and divided) fields except within
the narrow area of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Tempering my
pessimism is the suggestion that future litigants and future
courts can press the case for convergence by cultivating the
seeds that Justice Breyer has planted in his opinion.

7. 17 U.S. 518, 712 (1819) (finding that the New Hampshire legislature
lacked authority to impair the obligations of its charter to Dartmouth College);
see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937,
at 32–33 (1991) (summarizing commentary on Dartmouth College).
8. 22 U.S. 1, 239–40 (1824) (finding New York laws regulating water
navigation unconstitutional); see also PHILIP KURLAND, THE SUPREME COURT
AND PATENTS AND MONOPOLIES, at ix (1975).
9. 36 U.S. 420, 551 (1837) (holding that the Charles River Bridge grantholders did not have exclusive rights).
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PATENT & ANTITRUST

From a pedagogical standpoint, the majority and
dissenting opinions illustrate starkly the longstanding debate
over the relationship between patent and antitrust. This
section uses the dissenting and majority opinions, in that order,
to comment on that debate and show how the Actavis opinion
potentially leads us to a convergence of patent and antitrust
under the broader umbrella of competition law.
A. THE DISSENT AND ITS ROOTS
“A patent carves out an exception to the applicability of
antitrust laws.”10 In his now-familiar straightforward and
pellucid writing style, Chief Justice Roberts presented the basis
for his dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. As I
explain below, the Chief explained the basis in policy for this
exception and argued that the exception is deeply rooted in the
Court’s precedent. Through this straightforward language, the
Chief Justice also echoed the more archaic language of the
Statute of Monopolies of 1623 through which the English
Parliament struck back at the excesses of royal grants of
exclusive privileges. While the Statute voided all such grants, it
permitted patents for the “sole working or making[ ] of any
manner of new[ ] Manufacture within this Realm[ ].”11 In other
words, the exception Chief Justice Roberts identifies can be
traced back to the 1624 voiding of monopolies granted by the
crown, which created an exception for what would be described
as utility patents.12
Chief Justice Roberts does not cite the Statute of
Monopolies, largely because it would be inapposite for the legal
arguments in contention in Actavis. As a historical matter, the
grant of power to Congress to create patent law in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution reflected the recognition
that patent rights would be useful for society.13 However, the
power to grant patents was created narrowly in terms of the
purpose of the grant (to promote progress in the useful arts)

10. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
11. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac., c. 3, § 5 (Eng.).
12. Id. § 6.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
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and in the grant’s scope (limited Times, Inventors, Discoveries).
The common law’s aversion to restraints on trade was
recognized in the United States, and the case law before the
enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890 does not suggest that
patents were an exception to the common law.14 Instead, the
Supreme Court recognized limitations on the patent owner’s
rights to impose licensing restrictions based on the common
law’s regulation of restrictions on competition.15
While the exception identified by the Chief Justice may
parallel the Statute of Monopolies, the patent exception does
not reflect the law before the Sherman Act. The Court, for
example, read into the Patent Act the first sale doctrine, whose
parameters were shaped in a number of cases nearly twenty
years before the Sherman Act.16 The first sale doctrine in
patent law, or patent exhaustion, developed out of the scrutiny
of restraints on alienation under the common law.17 Such
scrutiny was consistent with the concern over state created
monopolies, as evinced by the Court’s decisions in Gibbons v.
Ogden and in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge. Given the
Court’s extensive discussion about restraints on alienation and
state-created monopolies throughout the nineteenth century
before the enactment of the Sherman Act, the exception
announced by the Chief Justice would be a relatively recent
one.
It is, however, doubtful that the exception even exists
under the Sherman Act. To the extent that the Sherman Act
was codifying a common law tradition, it is not the case that
the exception articulated by the Chief Justice is a completely
accurate statement of the status of patents under the Sherman
14. See, e.g., Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. 289, 293 (1855) (applying
restraint of trade analysis to a partnership involving joint patent ownership
and not finding a restraint). For a general discussion of the period before the
Sherman Act in the United States, see HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 47 (1954).
15. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 550–51 (1872).
16. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873). The Roberts Court affirmed
this and other pre-Sherman Act precedents relating to patent law and
competitive restraints in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. L.G. Electronics., Inc., 553
U.S. 617 (2008), and most recently in Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct.
1761 (2013). In the latter case, the Court affirmed not only patent exhaustion
but also an established exception (although in my opinion incorrectly). See id.
at 1766.
17. See Quanta, 533 U.S. at 625–28 (summarizing Supreme Court case
law regarding the patent exhaustion doctrine).

2014]

CONVERGENCE?

99

Act. The Chief Justice states that patents would come under
antitrust scrutiny in two cases.18 The first is the case of sham
litigation, which arises when a patent infringement lawsuit is
brought pretextually, masking an anticompetitive purpose.19
The second is the case of fraud on the patent office, when the
patent owner has obtained exclusive patent rights
fraudulently.20
These two situations do not exhaust the possibilities that
exist under the Sherman Act for an antitrust-based challenge
to a patent owner’s conduct in the marketplace.21 Patent
exhaustion was recognized after the enactment of the Sherman
Act. Although the Court did give the patent owner some leeway
in how patent licenses are negotiated, the Court recognized
that after the sale of the patented invention, patent rights were
exhausted, leaving only contractual claims.22 As a species of
contract, licensing provisions were not immunized from
antitrust scrutiny.23 The discussion of the majority opinion
below highlights these precedents. Put briefly, the presence of a
patent did not immunize licensing agreements from the
antitrust scrutiny of tying arrangements, cross-licensing, or
patent pooling.24 The dissent simplifies a fairly complicated
area into a pair of narrow rules. It would be a valid point that
the antitrust scrutiny of the business practices of patent
owners did not result in liability. But that result is a far cry
from the characterization of a patent immunity from antitrust.
The majority opinion poses a challenge to the dissenters to
identify any statutory basis for a patent immunity from
antitrust, either in the Patent Act, Sherman Act, Clayton Act,

18. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2239 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
19. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993).
20. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 177 (1965).
21. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (citing United States v. Line Material
Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948)).
22. See, e.g., Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625 (“The longstanding doctrine of
patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item
terminates all patent rights to that item.”).
23. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2232 (“[T]he Court has struck down overly
restrictive patent licensing agreements . . . .”).
24. See id. at 2231–34 (summarizing the Court’s historic treatment of
patent issues under antitrust law).
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or related provisions. Antitrust laws have no express or implied
immunities for patents.25 The 1995 Department of
Justice/Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for
Intellectual Property Licensing make no reference to patent
immunity.26 Furthermore, the conclusion that intellectual
property licensing should fall under the rule of reason for
antitrust analysis is consistent with this lack of immunity and
with the majority’s ruling in Actavis. In his dissent, Chief
Justice Roberts cites to neither antitrust statute nor guidelines.
There are not even any citations to the Patent Act. Section
271(d) exempts certain business practices from the defense of
patent misuse.27 This statutory exemption would not support
the broad immunity that the dissenters rely upon for their
judgment. Furthermore, the language of section 271(d) was in
part the basis for the Court’s 2006 ruling in Illinois Tool Works,
Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.28 that ownership of a patent was
not sufficient for the existence of market power, a big move
away from per se rules of illegality for tying arrangements
involving patents. The discussion of patents and antitrust in
the 2006 ruling provided no basis for patent immunity from
antitrust laws.
Most importantly, the three dissenting judges ignore the
Hatch-Waxman Act itself, which accords no immunity to patent
holders and whose passage supports placing limitations on
patent rights based on principles of competition policy. Enacted
to overrule in part the Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co. Federal Circuit decision,29 the HatchWaxman Act recognized the anticompetitive effects of patents
on the entry of generic competition in the pharmaceutical

25. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390–91 (1948)
(finding that courts considering antitrust challenges against patent holders
must “balance the privileges of [the patent holder] and its licensees under the
patent grants with the prohibitions of the Sherman Act”).
26. See U.S. DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (addressing the patent
misuse doctrine).
28. 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (noting that Congress amended the Patent Act
in 1988 to remove the market power presumption in patent misuse cases).
29. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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industry.30 The Court in Roche did adopt a position favorable to
the patent owner by allowing owners of patented
pharmaceuticals to enjoin generic drug manufacturers from
engaging in experiments to prepare competing versions of the
patented compound.31 Congress responded through the HatchWaxman Act to provide a basis for generic competition. The
Chief Justice’s opinion ignores the background to and the
purpose of the Act in finding a strong immunity for patent from
antitrust. In the dissent’s view, Congress created a mechanism
for generic drug competition that could readily be trumped by
the rights of the patent owner. Such immunity is in tension
with the need for limitations on patent rights that generic
competition would demand and that the Hatch-Waxman Act
attempts to implement.32
The broad patent immunity described in the dissent has no
basis in precedent or in the patent or antitrust statutes. It is
inconsistent with the Hatch-Waxman Act itself. Chief Justice
Roberts’ opinion grounds the immunity in the contrasting goals
of antitrust law and patent law. The former forbids
anticompetitive behavior in order to promote consumer welfare.
The latter allows limitations on competition in order to promote
innovation. For the dissent, these two goals are inconsistent.
The compromise is to limit antitrust law in situations where
patent law can serve the goal of innovation, as presumably is
the case with pharmaceuticals. These two allegedly divergent
policies are identified in the secondary literature and are
repeated throughout the opinion as incontrovertible.
However, the dissent does not acknowledge that the goals
of antitrust and patent law are complementary rather than
antithetical. Competition and patent rights in innovative
technologies can work in tandem to benefit consumers. Patent
owners are not immunized from antitrust law as long as they
are exercising their patent rights. Instead, business activities
of the patent owner need to be policed by antitrust law to

30. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (“The purpose of Title I of the
[Hatch-Waxman Act] is to make available more low cost generic drugs by
establishing a generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs . . . .”).
31. Roche, 733 F.2d at 863 (finding that the generic producer’s
experimentation infringed upon the patent).
32. See, e.g., Adam R. Young, Note, Generic Pharmaceutical Regulation in
the United States with Comparison to Europe: Innovation and Competition, 8
WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 165, 167–80 (2009).
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ensure that markets for innovative technologies are, in fact,
competitive. What the dissent misses, and the majority fails to
contend with, is that competition is a spectrum of activities, not
just part of a binary relationship with monopoly standing in
contrast. The choice is not between pure competition and no
competition, but in designing legal rules promoting the range of
competitive activities that patent owners engage in.
B. DISSECTING THE MAJORITY OPINION
Like the dissent, the majority opinion can also be distilled
into a simple proposition. As Justice Breyer states, even if the
patent owner is operating within the legally recognized
boundaries of the patent right, antitrust scrutiny can still
apply.33 The five-judge majority opinion grounds this
proposition in the Court’s precedent permitting antitrust suits
to proceed against patent owners engaged in questionable
patent pools and in exclusionary conduct aimed at preventing
new entrants into the marketplace.34 The accommodation of
patent and antitrust law occurs through the rule of reason
standard.35 While the opinion addresses the FTC’s argument in
support of a “quick look” rule of reason, one in which there
would be a presumption of anti-competitive behavior
potentially rebuttable by the patent owner, the majority rejects
the truncated approach, citing its 2000 opinion in California
Dental.36 Patent immunity is rejected, and rule of reason
consequently is the legal standard, requiring a consideration of
both anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications.37
A central criticism of the rule of reason is that it is too
open ended.38 Effectively, given litigation costs, the rule may
serve to immunize patent owners from suit. In practice, the
33. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013).
34. Id. (citing various cases in support of this proposition).
35. Id. at 2237 (finding that “the FTC must prove its case as in other ruleof-reason cases” due to the complexities of patent settlement disputes).
36. Id. (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999)).
37. Id. at 2231 (“[I]t would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality
by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent
law policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust
policies as well.”).
38. See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and
Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
733, 743–44 (2012) (describing problems with the open-ended approach within
the rule of reason).
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rule of reason, unlike immunity, invites scrutiny but also
requires fact-intensive analysis to find net effects that are anticompetitive. Given the inherently qualitative dimensions of
identifying anti-competitive effects, rule of reason would
predictably result in little imposition of liability. The obvious
open question is how the rule will be applied by litigants and
assessed by courts.
Justice Breyer’s opinion sets forth five anticompetitive
concerns. Acknowledging that settlement has benefits, reverse
payment settlements raise specific concerns under the
antitrust law. Preventing entry of new firms is anticompetitive
and is not justified in the scenario of generic drug entry.39
Presumably, in the case of patented pharmaceuticals, the main
purpose of patent law to incentivize invention of a new
compound has been realized. The issue is how intensively and
extensively the invention can be marketed by the patent owner.
Since there are consumer benefits to generic entry, the
justification for preventing such entry is far from clear.
Furthermore, given the size of the companies and the
concentrated markets for pharmaceuticals, patent owners are
in a position to bring about the potential anticompetitive effects
from preempted entry.40 Antitrust scrutiny is possible and,
Justice Breyer asserts, is administrable to limit the business
practices of patent owners.41 Finally, alternative forms of
settlement exist that do not involve reverse payments and the
highly likely division of the market that such reverse payment
settlements entail.42
Read in the narrowest possible way, the holding of Actavis
applies only to reverse payment settlements. Read as a
rejection of the position espoused by the dissent, the Actavis
decision opens up all business decisions by patent owners to
rule of reason analysis through the denial of any immunity
based in patent rights. A frustration with Justice Breyer’s
opinion is the ambiguity with which he writes. He starts the
opinion with a reference to Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.43 as
standing for the illegality of agreements not to compete.44 This
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–36.
Id. at 2236.
Id. at 2236–37.
Id. at 2237.
498 U.S. 46, 48 (1990).
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227 (citing Palmer, 498 U.S. at 46).
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broad holding is echoed in a citation to Verizon v. Trinko for the
proposition that “collusion” is “the supreme evil of antitrust.”45
Such language suggests that the majority had a broad holding
in mind. But the majority opinion always returned back from
such broad language to the specific facts of the case. Common
law reasoning was at work, and the analysis provides a
framework that addresses the case at hand but also leaves
open application to other situations.
What keeps the opinion from perhaps being a great one is
that there was no consideration of the competing policies with
an attempt to reconcile them. While the dissent takes for
granted the opposing policies of patent and antitrust, the
majority states that this tension is an assumption rather than
a reasoned conclusion. But the majority is equally facile in
asserting that competition policies apply to patent owners
despite arguments in support of the contrary, such as the
Statute of Monopolies. There is no attempt to deal with the
treatment of patents under common law rules against restraint
of trade. There is no engagement with the case law on patents
and monopoly before the Sherman Act. There is no discussion
of the meaning of competition and the economic, political, and
social policies that support competition norms. Of course, all
that discussion may be the substance of scholarly articles
rather than judicial opinions. But such policy engagement
would have been interesting to read and perhaps even
enlightening.
Arguably, we saw an example of such policy analysis in
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,46 the other big case from
the 2012 Supreme Court Term dealing with intellectual
property and competition. At issue in that case was the right of
a copyright owner to prevent resale of an imported, copyrighted
work.47 Previous confrontations of the issue resulted in split
courts struggling over the literal meaning of the statute.48
45. Id. at 2233 (citing Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
46. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
47. Id. at 1355.
48. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011)
(holding that the first sale doctrine does not apply to copies of copyrighted
works manufactured outside of the United States); Omega S.A. v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the first sale
doctrine applies only to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made in the
United States).
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Some light appeared as the Justices ventured into the policies
and consequences of different statutory readings. Engaging in a
pragmatic form of common law reasoning, the Court reached
the result of limiting the rights of copyright owners by
expanding the first sale doctrine.49 Arguably the Court was
concerned, in part, with what the impact of a contrary ruling
might be on free trade and the well-being of consumers.50
Justice Breyer’s opinion in Actavis, much like his majority
opinion in Kirtsaeng, engaged with the consequences of
allowing reverse payment settlements. But the engagement is
limited to the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the
identified goal of promoting generic competition. The holding of
Kirtsaeng is a broad one that cuts across different markets and
industries. By contrast, the holding’s reach in Actavis is more
limited. The Court identified an overlap between patent and
antitrust law and clearly rejected the separation of the
statutory schemes of patent and antitrust accepted by the
dissent. But it failed to explain how the situation of generic
drug competition might generalize to other situations where
patent owners may be acting anti-competitively. Does the
Court’s adoption of the rule of reason apply to all business
practices by patent owners, or is it limited to the HatchWaxman context? To answer that question, one would need to
develop a theory of how antitrust and patent laws converge. I
conclude my comments with a sketch of what such a theory
might look like and implications for intellectual property law
beyond the Hatch-Waxman Act.
II. IDENTIFYING CONVERGENCE
Two policy questions arise in the controversy over reverse
payment settlements. The first is the question of the
relationship between intellectual property and competition.
The second is whether business practices involving patents
should give rise to antitrust scrutiny. The Court in Actavis is
concerned with the second, much narrower question, with its
implications for judicial administrability, litigation threats for
private parties, and availability of adequate remedies.
Understandably, the Court’s attention turns to the second,

49. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1358.
50. Id. at 1364–67.
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narrower and more justiciable question. But a satisfactory
answer requires some engagement with the first.
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent assumes an answer to the
first, namely that patent law’s concern is with innovation, not
competition. This assumption is never explained. Presumably,
it reflects the view that antitrust law deals with the market
conditions for a competitive price while patent law deals with
the conditions for the creation and commercialization of new
technologies. While academic scholarship supports this view, it
may also be justified by the two separate statutory schemes
that Congress has adopted for antitrust and for patent.
But academic scholars do not all readily accept a
distinction between competition and innovation.51 The latter is
a form of competition that takes place with respect to an
economic variable other than price: perhaps quality, perhaps
technological improvement. Economist Kenneth Arrow
famously argued that at least with respect to cost-saving
technologies, competitive markets would provide more
incentives to innovate than monopolized ones.52 Professor
Arrow was considering the case in which the innovative firm
develops technology that lowers its costs and potentially those
of other firms in the industry. His analysis would be different if
the
technological
innovation
would
permit
product
differentiation. However, competition may foster innovation
better than strong exclusivity even in the case of technologyinduced product differentiation. Professor Arrow’s argument
suggests that competitive conditions matter for innovation. Put
another way, antitrust and patent laws may reside in separate
provisions of the United States Code, but they are not
independent of each other.
Justice Breyer’s majority decision recognizes this
interdependence. Unfortunately, the majority opinion also fails
to engage the first question of how intellectual property relates
to competition. Like the dissenters, the majority does not
51. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION
MACHINE 93 (2002); MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2009);
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21–22 (1970).
52. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Innovation, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research
ed., 1962).
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engage with the pre-Sherman Act case law in which concerns
with competition informed the application of patent law, such
as the cases involving patent exhaustion and other areas of
patent licensing.53 These cases are not anti-patent by any
means. Patent owners did not inevitably and predictably lose
once under scrutiny from competition policy. Instead, what
these pre-1890 cases teach is that patent law is developed and
applied with considerations of competition issues and concerns
that the scope of the patent right might be construed in ways
that would be anticompetitive. The underlying conviction is
arguably that market competition drives innovation, and
patent law should be applied with that principle in mind.
The difficulty is that with the enactment of the Sherman
Act, the search for the correct model of market competition
drives the legal and policy analysis of antitrust. If the ideal is
one of perfect price competition, then the model of a patent
owner licensing access to the market for an innovative
technology is antithetical to the goals of antitrust laws. But
these contrasting idealized models are not representative
either of the type of competition antitrust law tries to protect or
of the way in which innovation occurs. Firms compete on
variables other than price and in market settings where there
might be a concentration of firms, contra the idealized perfect
competition model. Antitrust law functions within these
market settings as well. Furthermore, patent owners face
competition from other innovators who have created substitute
technologies and from design-around by unwilling licensees.
The competitive norms of antitrust and patent are not as stark
and contrasting as one might first think. Unfortunately, the
Actavis Court does not engage with these points.
This lack of engagement is surprising given the Court’s
2006 decision in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc., in which the Court unanimously ruled that patent
ownership does not create a presumption of market power.54
Logically, if one accepts that proposition, then patent
ownership could in principle be consistent with competitive
markets, and would be one factor to consider in the broader
competitive analysis of antitrust. Justice Stevens wrote the
majority opinion in Independent Ink, signed on to by the three

53. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
54. 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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dissenters in Actavis and three of the five justices who signed
onto the Actavis majority.55
Are the dissenters being inconsistent? One way to reconcile
the contrasting positions of Justices Roberts, Scalia, and
Thomas is that in both Independent Ink and Actavis, the three
are urging a strong separation between patent and antitrust.
In Independent Ink, patent ownership alone cannot buttress
the antitrust claim. The three may even go so far as to suggest
patent ownership has no bearing on the antitrust analysis. By
contrast, the three justices in the majority for both Independent
Ink and Actavis would most likely reason that patent
ownership might have some bearing on the competitiveness
analysis. How much, we can only speculate. It would be
interesting to see what type of opinion Justice Stevens would
have written in Actavis. His keen eye on the shared goals of
competition in antitrust law and patent law was shown in his
Independent Ink decision and came out in the failed majority
opinion (but strong concurrence) he penned for Bilski v.
Kappos, the 2010 decision about the patentability of business
method patents.56
One may finish reading the Actavis opinions, and this
Comment, with the unsettling feeling that there is just an
ideological divide among the Justices with some being propatent and others being pro-antitrust. Of course, that reading
would be frustrating and would, I think erroneously, accept the
very divide between patent and antitrust assumed by the three
dissenters.
What might be more helpful is to understand the divisions
among the Justices in terms of deference to Congress. The
dissenters view the antitrust statutes and the patent act as
having independent significance. Each is a separate enactment
by Congress, aimed at distinct policies. As I have suggested,
this position ignores the historical developments of the two
statutory schemes since the Statute of Monopolies, and
specifically the treatment of patents before the enactment of
the Sherman Act. As pointed out above, the 1623 Statute itself
carved out an exception for patents of invention from the
prohibition against monopoly grants. I do not see evidence that

55. Justice Sotomayor replaced Justice Souter, and Justice Alito recused
himself in both Independent Ink and Actavis.
56. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the Chief Justice took a cue from this 1623 enactment in
writing his dissent, although the earlier pronouncement does
resonate in the 2013 opinion. My sense is that the Chief Justice
is looking at what contemporary Congress has done and does
not see evidence of overlap between the two statutory schemes.
The majority, I would argue, also is showing deference to
Congress, but its deference is to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the
heart of the controversy in reverse payment settlement
disputes. Justice Breyer confronts this statutory scheme
directly and concludes that reverse payment settlements
subvert the goals of the scheme to promote the entry of generic
competition. The remedy he proposes is found in antitrust law.
As many critics of the Actavis decision have pointed out, the
ideal remedy would be to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act and
implement a more effective means of promoting generic
competition. But that remedy is not available to a Supreme
Court Justice. Instead, what the majority does is identify two
conflicting legislative schemes, that of separate patent and
antitrust statutes, and that of Hatch-Waxman, which
intertwines patent and antitrust law. Instead of deferring to
the first, as the dissenters do, the majority deferred to the goals
of the second by allowing an antitrust claim to serve as a basis
for reviewing settlements that deter generic competition. How
far this review will go is for the lower courts to determine,
possibly with the Supreme Court offering guidance in the
distant future. The majority, however, does not pronounce a
convergence of antitrust and patent law under the canopy of
competition law and policy. Instead, the court seeks to
implement its understanding of Congress’ vision of competition
as enacted in the Hatch-Waxman Act.
What supports deference to Congress as the key to
understanding Actavis is the striking citation to the Court’s
unanimous decision in Verizon v. Trinko, from 2004.57 Justice
Breyer cites the case for the proposition that collusion is an evil
that antitrust law combats.58 This quote is odd because Trinko
was not about collusion; it was a monopolization case.
Furthermore, it was a case in which the Court unanimously
agreed that no antitrust claim could be brought, because of

57. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 408 (2004); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
58. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013).
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Congress’ scheme for deregulating (really reregulating) the
telecommunications industry. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court,59 famously stated that antitrust law “does not give
judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of
doing business whenever some other approach might yield
greater competition.”60
Justice Breyer signed on to Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Trinko and might be accused of exercising such carte blanche in
Actavis. Actually, Justice Breyer, through his majority opinion,
is doing precisely what Justice Scalia was urging in Trinko:
deferring to a Congressional scheme for competition. Arguably,
it is Chief Justice Roberts and his fellow dissenters who are
engaging in judicial carte blanche by ignoring Congress’s goals
in the Hatch-Waxman Act. But I would hold all the Justices
guilty for not better engaging in how both antitrust and patent
laws serve the goals of competitive markets.
A comparison with the approach to reverse payment
settlements in the European Union is instructive. A few days
after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Actavis, the
European Competition Commission levied a substantial fine
against the Danish company Lundbeck for engaging in
anticompetitive reverse payment settlements with generic drug
companies. In its press release, the Commission pronounced
what is tantamount to a per se rule:
But instead of competing, the generic producers agreed with
Lundbeck in 2002 not to enter the market in return for substantial
payments and other inducements from Lundbeck amounting to tens
of millions of euros. Internal documents refer to a “club” being
formed and “a pile of $$$” to be shared among the participants.
Lundbeck paid significant lump sums, purchased generics’ stock for
the sole purpose of destroying it, and offered guaranteed profits in a
distribution agreement. The agreements gave Lundbeck the
certainty that the generics producers would stay out of the market
for the duration of the agreements without giving the generic
producers any guarantee of market entry thereafter. These
agreements are very different from other settlements of patent

59. Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Souter concurred as to the judgment,
but reasoned that the case should be dismissed for lack of standing by Trinko,
who was not an actual competitor of Verizon and therefore was not injured.
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 416–18 (Stevens, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 415 (majority opinion).
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disputes where generic companies are not simply paid off to stay out
of the market.61

The Commission based its decision on general principles of
competition policy and the dynamics of the pharmaceutical
market in Europe.62 While the European Parliament has not
adopted legislation similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the
member states of the European Union use price controls to
regulate the pharmaceutical sector63 and allow generic
competition through hybrid forms of identified compounds.64 In
addition, parallel importation from one member nation to
another permits competition in the pharmaceutical industry.65
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis does not
appeal to general competition principles and does not open up
broad antitrust scrutiny of agreements of patents. Instead, the
majority is inviting scrutiny of reverse patent settlements that
are inconsistent with the model of generic competition provided
by the Hatch-Waxman Act. Hence my conclusion that what
underlies the Actavis decision is deference to Congressional
judgments.
A more optimistic reading of the Actavis opinion is that it
invites antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason for all
agreements involving patents, whether patent licenses,
assignments, or settlements. Peter Carstensen, an anointed
61. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Lundbeck
and Other Pharma Companies for Delaying Market Entry of Generic
Medicines 1 (June 19, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-13-563_en.htm?locale=en. Lundbeck was fined €93.8 million, with
several generic medicine producers fined a total of €52.2 million. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Young, supra note 32, at 180–83.
64. See id. at 184 (describing use of generic substitutes). Allowing
substitutes for patented compounds, known as hybrid compounds, is permitted
under the European Union directive regulating pharmaceuticals. Article 10(3)
of the directive defines hybrid compounds and Article 10(6) excludes them
from patentability. See Directive 2001/83/EC, of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code Relating to
Medicinal Products for Human Use 2001/83/EC, arts. 10(3), 10(6), 2004 O.J. (L
311) 67; see also Generic/Hybrid Applications: Questions and Answers, EUR.
MEDICINES AGENCY, http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/
regulation/general/general_content_000179.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac0580022717
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (providing general information on generic and
hybrid applications in Europe).
65. See Parallel Imports of Proprietary Medicinal Products, EUROPA.EU,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_for_go
ods/pharmaceutical_and_cosmetic_products/l23110_en.htm (last updated June
10, 2005).
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distinguished professor who has published about twenty-nine
articles over forty years of being a professor at Wisconsin Law
School according to the School’s own searchable bibliography,
pronounced to me that out of Justice Breyer’s opinion may
bloom an ancillary restraint doctrine for the intersection of
patent and antitrust. As I understand his point, the Actavis
decision may be a re-articulation of the rule of reason adopted
by the Supreme Court in its 1899 decision, Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States.66 In that case, the Court scrutinized
an agreement among competitors to raise the price of steel in
order to avoid a ruinous price war. The Court found this was
impermissible under the rule of reason because of the
unreasonable market harm caused by the increased price.67
The Court, however, did not adopt the ancillary restraint
doctrine used by Judge Taft in his opinion for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.68 Under the ancillary
restraint doctrine, an agreement among competitors is illegal
unless it is ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract or
it is necessary to protect the enjoyment of legitimate fruits
from an enterprise or to prevent injury.69 Without doing harm
to Professor Carstensen’s position,70 I understand his point to
be that the rule of reason in Actavis may serve to promote
scrutiny of the conduct of patent owners, especially if modeled
on the ancillary restraint doctrine.
We can only see how future courts apply Actavis to see if
the ancillary restraint doctrine comes into its own or if
deference to the legislatively-prescribed terms of generic
competition prevails. What I am confident of is that the
dissent’s narrow view of the relationship between patent and
antitrust law has been rejected. We are, however, far away
from their convergence.

66. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
67. Id. at 234–35.
68. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
69. Id. at 282.
70. Although the comments discussed in this text are derived from oral
conversation, a published account of Miller Professor Carstensen’s over-thetop thinking of the ancillary restraint doctrine, which may be alienating to
some, can be found in Peter Carstensen, Post-Sale Restraints Via Patent
Licensing: A “Seedcentric” Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1053, 1054–55 (2006).
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III. CONCLUSION
A friend made the following comment to me about two
recent Supreme Court cases relating to intellectual property: “I
guess you must have liked the Myriad decision71 and disliked
the Bowman decision.”72 My response was that I liked the
Bowman decision because it could have been worse and
disliked the Myriad decision because it could have been better.
If he had asked about the Actavis decision, my response would
have been that it came out just like I expected it would.
Antitrust law poses a facile choice for judges: per se illegality or
rule of reason. There may be some room for nuance, but only a
little. More engagement with the policies underlying
competition would be desirable. Instead, those thinking about
antitrust engage with models of markets that may provide
some guidance but lead invariably to the rule of reason.
Ultimately, in my opinion, the best way to realize effective
competition policy in intellectual property is more targeted
intellectual property doctrines. The prize for most important
case about intellectual property and competition policy during
the 2012 Supreme Court term goes not to Actavis, but to
Kirtsaeng.

71. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2120 (2013) (invalidating patents on naturally occurring DNA
sequences).
72. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768–69 (2013) (holding
that patent exhaustion does not permit making another copy of a patented
seed germplasm).
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